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"That Belongs in a Museum!"' Rubin v.
Iran: Implications for the Persian
Collection of the Oriental Institute of the
University of Chicago
I. INTRODUcTION
Imagine a situation in which a priceless document from the
founding of the United States was loaned to a foreign museum for
analysis. Furthermore, imagine that at the same time this
document traveled abroad, the U.S. government owed money to
citizens of that foreign state. As a result, these foreigners, to whom
money was owed, decided to file a lawsuit in their country arguing
that the document should be put up for auction so that the
proceeds from the sale could pay off the U.S. government's debt.
After the sale, the document could end up in a museum or in a
private collection anywhere in the world, removed from public
view and without assured continuation of access by historians and
scholars.
While, at first glance, the aforementioned situation appears to
be unbelievable, many of its components are analogous to a case
that is currently on the docket of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois. This case, Rubin v. Islamic
Republic of Iran,2 calls for the auction sale of ancient Persian
artifacts that are considered by scholars to be "[o]ne of the best
sources of information we have about the Persian Empire."3 The
artifacts are tablets on which government records of the Persian
1. Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade (Paramount Pictures 1989).
2. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1110 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
[hereinafter Rubin f]; Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 408 F. Supp. 2d 549, 551 (N.D. Ill.
2005) [hereinafter Rubin II]; Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03-C9370, 2007 WL
1169701, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Rubin IV]; Rubin v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, No. 03-C9370, 2008 WL 192321, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Rubin
V1.
3. Amy Braverman Puma, Worth Millions... or Priceless?, U. CHI. MAG., Oct.
2006, at 16, 18.
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King Darius I were written.' Scholars argue that the tablets
"resonate for Iranians at a very profound level" 5 because they are
actual accounts of the Persian Empire written by the Persians
themselves. Moreover, as the cultural heritage of the people of
Iran, the. tablets are "as important as the crown jewels of England,
or the original document of the Magna Carta, or the Western Wall
in Jerusalem, or the Parthenon in Athens."' Why would such
important pieces of history be put up for auction?
The plaintiffs in Rubin argue that because the artifacts in
question are Persian and belong to Iran, they should be sold in
order to compensate victims of Iran-financed terrorism.7 The
artifacts were excavated in Iran by the Oriental Institute of the
University of Chicago in the 1930s, and have been on scholarly
loan at the Institute ever since.8 In examining this case, the
question arises whether cultural property owned by a sovereign, in
this case Iran, may be used to satisfy a legal judgment against that
sovereign.
The purpose of this note is to argue that cultural property
should be immune from plaintiffs' rights to recovery and that it is
legally and morally unjust for such property to be used to satisfy a
legal judgment against a sovereign. In order to support this
argument, this note will examine U.S. federal legislation, including
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 'Act (FSIA),9 as well as
international conventions of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which
specifically call for international cooperation to protect cultural
property." In addition, this note will demonstrate that since bills
have been introduced in the U.S. Congress as alternatives to
lawsuits under the terrorist state exception of the FSIA, a blanket
immunity of cultural property does not leave plaintiffs without
4. Matthew W. Stolper, The Persepolis Fortification Tablets, ORIENTAL INST. NEWS
& NOTES, Jan. 2007, at 6.
5. Gil J. Stein, A Heritage Threatened: The Persepolis Tablets Lawsuit and the
Oriental Institute, ORIENTAL INST. NEWS & NOTES, Jan. 2007, at 3-4.
6. Id.
7. Rubin I, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
8. Stein, supra note 5, at 3-4.
9. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2000).
10. E.g., Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, Nov. 16, 1945, 4 U.N.T.S. 275 [hereinafter. UNESCO Constitution];
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
Nov. 23, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter World Heritage Convention].
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remedy." Finally, this note will argue that changes in U.S.
legislation are necessary in order to prevent future lawsuits calling
for cultural property to satisfy legal judgments.
I. RUBIN V. IRAN
A. Background
The Rubin case stems from the September 1997 suicide
bombing at a pedestrian mall on Ben Yehuda Street in Jerusalem,
which killed five bystanders and left 192 people injured. 2 Hamas
claimed responsibility for the bombing and the Islamic Republic of
Iran was found to be its financial backer.'3 On July 31, 2001,
American survivors filed a civil suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia against the Islamic Republic of
Iran, the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security, and high-
ranking Iranian government officials." Jurisdiction for the case
was based on a FSIA provision that provides an exception to
sovereign immunity for acts of "extrajudicial killing."" The
defendants were found at fault because they were active financiers
of Hamas and the bombing would not have occurred without their
financial support. 6 When the defendants did not appear in court,
the court entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
They were awarded $423.5 million in damages,' 7 including $300
million in punitive damages.'8
B. Collecting on the Award
David J. Strachman, the plaintiffs' attorney, attempted to
collect on his clients' award from Iranian assets held in the United
11. See, e.g., Press Release, United States Senator Arlen Specter, Lautenberg/Specter
Bill to Provide Justice for Victims of State-Sponsored Signed into Law (Jan. 29, 2008),
http://specter.senate.gov/publicindex.cfm?FuseAction=NewsRoom.NewsReleases&Conte
ntRecord id=c67d30d9-c790-514e-f446-d7f7dOe86ldf&Region-id=&Issueid=
[hereinafter Lautenberg/Specter Bill].
12. Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258,261 (D.D.C. 2003).
13. Id. at 262.
14. James Wawrzyniak, Rubin v. The Islamic Public of Iran: A Struggle for Control of
Persian Antiquities in America, HARV. L. SCH. STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, Paper 17,
at 2 (June 21, 2007), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard/students/papers/17/.
15. Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
16. Id. at 262.
17. Id. at 274-79.
18. Alicia Hilton, The Persepolis Tablets: Terror Victims Target Ancient Persian
Artifacts, THE AM. BAR ASS'N: SECTION OF LITIG., Apr. 2007 (on file with law review).
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States. Because Iran is designated by the U.S. State Department as
a supporter of terrorism, however, Iranian assets in the United
States are blocked or frozen for attachment. '9 Nevertheless,
Strachman tried to extract funds from bank accounts belonging to
the Consulate General of Iran.20 This method did not work
because the funds already had a lien upon them by an earlier
judgment creditor. 2 In addition, attempts to seize Iranian-
controlled bank accounts held by the Bank of New York proved
fruitless; and the sale of an Iranian residence located in Lubbock,
Texas, yielded a mere $390,000.22
The Oriental Institute of the University of 'Chicago received
significant media coverage in April 2004 when it returned three
hundred ancient Persian tablets to officials of the Iranian Cultural
Heritage Organization, Iran's national antiquities department.3
Following the much-publicized story of the artifacts' return to
Iran, the first return of archaeological artifacts on loan from Iran
since 1979,24 Strachman and his team adopted the novel approach
of executing the judgment upon Persian antiquities in museum
collections throughout the United States. ' They argued before the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
that museums, like the Oriental Institute of the University of
Chicago, held antiquities which could be attached by the plaintiffs
as judgment creditors of Iran. These priceless collections would
then be sold at auction to the highest bidder to raise money to pay
the plaintiffs' judgment award. 27
19. Jennifer Elsea, Lawsuits Against State Supporters of Terrorism: An Overview, THE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: CRS REPORT, CRS-1 (June 23, 2005) [hereinafter Elsea,
Lawsuits Against State Supporters].
20. Wawrzyniak, supra note 14, at 6.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 6-7.
23. Press Release, University of Chicago, University of Chicago Returns Ancient
Persian Tablets Loaned by Iran, (Apr. 28, 2004), available at http://www-
news.uchicago.edu/releases/04/040428.tablets.shtml.
24. Id. See Wawrzyniak, supra note 14, at 9.
25. Ron Grossman, Persian Treasure Trove on the Line at U. of C.: Suit Over
Terrorism Could Force Their Sale, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 2006, at 7.
26. Wawrzyniak, supra note 14, at 7.
27. Id.
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C. How the PFA Differs from Other Museum Collections at Issue
in the Lawsuit
Unlike the Persian collections of the Field Museum of
Natural History, Harvard University art museums, and Boston's
Museum of Fine Arts, which are also at issue in the lawsuit, the
Persepolis Fortification Archive (PFA) of the Oriental Institute
was not purchased. As previously described, the PFA was
scientifically excavated by Oriental Institute archaeologists under
the leadership of Ernst Herzfeld.' It arrived at the Oriental
Institute in Chicago in 1936, on loan from the Iranian government
for the purposes of translation and analysis,29 the details of which
will be described later in this work. The tens of thousands of 2,500-
year-old clay tablets discovered during these excavations are in
fragile physical condition and are written mainly in Elamite
cuneiform alphabet, the oldest written language of Iran.3" It is
thought that only twenty or so researchers in the world can read
this language and many of them are on residency at the Oriental
Institute. 3' At present, two-thirds of the collection has been
returned to Iran, while eight thousand tablets and eleven thousand
poorly preserved fragments remain at the Oriental Institute for
study.32
The Oriental Institute argued that the artifacts in question
were immune from attachment under the FSIA provisions
concerning the enforcement of judgments against foreign
sovereigns. Iran entered the case after the Court ruled in
plaintiffs' favor, stating that the Oriental Institute "[is] not entitled
to assert immunity on Iran's behalf."34 Iran maintained that the
artifacts in question were immune from execution under the
FSIA.3' The plaintiffs argued against Iran's assertion and were
awarded another victory in March 2007 by Magistrate Judge
Ashman.36 Judge Ashman's decision allowed the plaintiffs more
28. Daniel Parisi, Of Ancient Empires and Modern Litigation: A Lawsuit Jeopardizes
the Persepolis Fortification Archive at the Oriental Institute, TABLEAU, Winter 2008, at 11,
12.
29. Stein, supra note 5, at 4.
30. Id. at 3-4.
31. Id. at 4.
32. Id.
33. Rubin 11, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 554.
34. Rubin v. Iran, 436 F. Supp. 2d 938, 946 (D. Ill. 2006).
35. Rubin IV, 2007 WL 1169701 at *2.
36. Id. at *14.
2009]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
time to complete their discovery in support of their claim that the
artifacts in question were subject to the "commercial use"
exception of the FSIA.17 Additionally, the decision allowed the
plaintiffs further discovery into the Chogha Mish Collection of the
Oriental Institute, which the plaintiffs also sought to attach. 8 In
response, Iran filed a "Motion for Clarification on Rulings
Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel, or in the Alternative,
Motion for Protective Order." 9 The U.S. Department of Justice
(Justice Department) filed a "Statement of Interest" in support of
the Oriental Institute and Iran.4 0 However, in his January 2008
decision, Judge Ashman denied both of Iran's motions and
allowed the plaintiffs' general discovery of Iran's assets in the
United States. 41
III. PERSIAN FORTIFICATION ARCHIVE
A. The Oriental Institute's Excavations
Founded in 1919, the Oriental Institute of the University of
Chicago is a research institution and a museum that focuses on the
study of the ancient Near East. 2 It has sponsored excavations and
survey projects in every country in the region, the results of which
"have defined the basic chronologies for many ancient Near
Eastern civilizations and have helped determine the time when
mankind made the transition from hunter-gatherer to settled
community life."" Moreover, archaeologists at the Oriental
Institute have been at the forefront of developing new methods for
excavation, including the use of interdisciplinary teams as well as
aerial surveys to map archaeological sites."
In 1931, with the financial support of an anonymous
benefactress, 3 Oriental Institute archaeologists began excavations
37. Id. at *11.
38. Id. at *6.
39. Rubin V, 2008 WL 192321 at *1.
40. Id.
41. Id. at *20.
42. The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago A Brief History,
http://oi.uchicago.edu/research/history (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago The Persian Expedition,
http://oi.uchicago.edu/research/projects/per/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
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at the Takht-i-Jamshid (Farsi for "Persepolis"'6) site in
southwestern Iran. 7 The construction of this- imperial residence
complex, known as Persepolis, began during the reign of Darius I
(522 to 486 B.C.E) and continued under his son, Xerxes (486 to
465 B.C.E.) and subsequent Achaemenid rulers." Persepolis was
conquered in 330 B.C.E. by Alexander the Great and his invading
armies, and remained unexcavated until 1931. ' 9 In 1933,
construction of a truck ramp to the terrace of Persepolis led to the
discovery of clay tablets in a fortification wall surrounding the
complex .5' After excavations by the Oriental Institute, the 30,000
tablets which were unearthed were appropriately named the
Persepolis Fortification Archive (PFA). 5
Today, there are laws regulating the export of artifacts from
their countries of origin. When Oriental Institute archaeologists
conducted the excavations at Persepolis in the first half of the 20th
century, the system of partage was still in place. James Cuno,
director of the Art Institute of Chicago, described partage as the
following:
Foreign archaeologists excavated -scientifically -and shared
the finds with the local authorities and the host institutions. The
archaeological museums of the great universities of the world-
in the U.S. that would be the University of Chicago,
Pennsylvania, Yale and Harvard-all were built through this
system of partage. As were the local museums in Baghdad,
Kabul and Cairo. Objects were excavated, preserved and
shared. 52
After an excavation, artifacts were divided into two piles. The
source nation, or the country in which the excavation was held,
chose one pile, and the other pile returned with the archaeological
team to its sponsoring institution.53 Because archaeologists
"depend on the goodwill of source nations to conduct their digs, 54
46. Stolper, supra note 4, at 6.
47. Id
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Parisi, supra note 28, at 12.
51. Id. at 11-12.
52. Richard Lacayo, A Talk with James Cuno, TIME, Jan. 27 2008, available at
http://lookingaround.blogs.time.com/2008/01/27/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2008)..
53. Richard Lacayo, Who Owns History?, TIME, Feb. 21 2008, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1715290,00.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2008).
54. Id.
20091 263
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partage appeared to be fair given the dearth of laws regarding
cultural property in both source nations and nations that
sponsored archaeological excavations. It was in the light of partage
that the Oriental Institute and Iran entered into an agreement that
allowed for the entire PFA collection to travel to Chicago to be
studied by Oriental Institute researchers and then to be returned
to Iran upon completion.
In preliminary analyses of the PFA, Oriental Institute
researchers found that the tablets appeared to be administrative
records dealing with the daily lives of ordinary people living in the
Persian Empire. " There was no mention of the actions of kings or
important people, which scholars had presumed they would find.56
Some of the tablets had only the impressions of seals and no text at
all. 7 Those tablets with text were mostly written in the little-
known Elamite language.58 In the 1930s, there were no Elamite
texts for scholars to use for comparative study, making it difficult
for researchers to understand the collection.59 Richard T. Hallock,
an Oriental Institute scholar who began a meticulous study of the
Elamite tablets after his return from naval service in World War
II, published the first work on the texts in 1969. Hallock's
publication was fundamental because it detailed over 2,000 of the
tablets. It listed identifiable seals and impressions, gave the basics
of Achaemenid Elamite grammar, and provided a glossary of all
other known Achaemenid Elamite texts. 61 Hallock's publication
also included translations and transliterations of the texts and
provided a thorough account of the transactions and
administrative systems documented by the texts.6 2 In 1978,
Margaret Root published the first part of her study of the seal
impressions on the Elamite tablets based on Hallock's earlier
work. 63
The careful research of Hallock and Root enabled scholars to
make sense of the PFA. In brief, "[tjhe PFA was an administrative
repository in which the royal clerks and supervisors recorded the
55. Parisi, supra note 28, at 12.
56. Id.
57. Stolper, supra note 4, at 7.
58. Id.
59. Parisi, supra note 28, at 12.
60. Id. at 13.
61. Id.
62. Stolper, supra note 4, at 7-8.
63. Parisi, supra note 25, at 12.
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storage and outlay of stocks of food," usually to people who were
on the government payroll. These people included ordinary
workers, skilled craftsmen, administrators and travelers. In terms
of their importance to scholarship, the tablets are the only known
first-hand accounts of the daily life of the Persian Empire,
providing detailed descriptions of the movement of people and
goods throughout the Empire and insights into its internal
workings. 65
Professor Matthew Stolper of the Oriental Institute explained
that research and publications on the PFA have had four main
implications on the understanding of the ancient Iranian past.
First, because the Elamite texts have transcriptions of Iranian
names and titles, they are a resource for the study of other ancient
Iranian languages as well as the vocabulary of production and
administration.' Second, thanks to the seal impressions present on
some of the tablets, they are able to be securely dated to the
narrow time range of Darius I, from 509 to 494 B.C.E.67 As a third
point, the tablets are "a basis for reinterpreting fragmentary
administrative records from other regions of the Achaemenid
Empire." 6 Finally, the PFA proves that the Achaemenids were
not the "illiterate barbarian rulers ' 69 as was previously thought.
The texts provide evidence that the Achaemenid rulers "were
successors to millennia of statecraft and administrative
technique,"70 had "meticulously controlled regional institutions,""
and "kept close communication with regional systems embedded
in other societies of the Empire."72
B. Why the PFA is Important
As pieces of hand-formed clay with seemingly
incomprehensible cuneiform impressions, the individual tablets
and fragments of the PFA by themselves are rather unimpressive.
Professor Stolper explained that the true significance of the tablets
64. Id. at 13.
65. Puma, supra note 3, at 18.
66. Stolper, supra note 4, at 7-8.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id. at 7.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Parisi, supra note 28, at 18.
72. Id.
2009]
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lies in the story they tell as a comprehensive unit. In an interview
on National Public Radio, Stolper stated:
[W]hen you start putting [the tablets] together, you find out that
they're part of an information system that represents an
administrative system that gave you a slice of the population
around the king that reached from the king himself and his
cousins down to the lowest worker in the vicinity of the palace. 13
Like Stolper, Professor Gil Stein, Director of the Oriental
Institute, also emphasizes the necessity of keeping the PFA
together. Stein explains: "Unexpected discoveries are still being
made, and the meaning and reliability of every piece depends on
its connections with the whole information system of the entire
Fortification Archive." 
7
1
Furthermore, the tablets are extremely important because
they provide a unique resource for scholarship and have modern
significance as "irreplaceable items of cultural heritage for the
people of Iran." 75 To demonstrate the modern significance of the
tablets, Professor Gil Stein emphasizes that "Persepolis and the
Persian Empire are the central symbols of Iranian cultural
identity." 76 In addition, because these tablets are the actual records
of the Persian King Darius I, scholars argue that they are as
important to the cultural heritage of the Iranian people.
IV. U.S. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A. History of the FSIA
A brief review of the history of foreign sovereign immunity in
the United States leading up to the passage of the FSIA is
necessary for a discussion of FSIA and its "commercial use"
exception presented in Rubin v. Iran. To begin, the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon
78
demonstrates the classic notion of sovereign immunity. In this
case, the Emperor of France seized a vessel owned by two
73. Radio broadcast: Fight Over Ancient Persian Tablets Goes to U.S. Court
(July 17, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5562022
(last visited Apr. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Fight Over Ancient Persian Tablets Goes to U.S.
Court].
74. Parisi, supra note 28, at 18.
75.- Stein, supra note 5, at 3.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 4.
78. See generally Schooner Exchange v. McFaddofi, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
266 [Vol. 31:257
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Americans. When the vessel sailed into U.S. territory as an
armed French military ship, the American plaintiffs claimed to be
its rightful owners and sought execution on the vessel.' Using the
principles of international customary law, Chief Justice Marshall.
emphasized the "perfect equality and absolute independence of
sovereigns, [a] common interest impelling them to mutual
intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each other."8'
In stressing the importance for states to maintain friendly
relations, Marshall's opinion re-established that a sovereign could
enter upon foreign territory "in the confidence that the immunities
belonging to his independent sovereign station, though not
expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be
extended to him." 12 Marshall also made a clear distinction between
the status of public armed ships in foreign waters and the status of
the private property of a sovereign in a foreign land. The U.S.
Supreme Court's decision exempted the French military vessel
from U.S. jurisdiction, thereby making it immune from judicial
proceedings in American courts, and confirmed that foreign state
immunity is based upon customary international law. '
In 1952, the United States followed an international trend in
adopting a more restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity. 85
The U.S. State Department announced its implementation of the
restrictive theory in a 1952 letter to the Attorney General from
79. Id. at 117.
80. Id. at 136.
81. Id. at 137.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 145 ("[T]here is a manifest distinction between the private property of
the person who happens to be a prince, and that military force which supports the
sovereign power, and maintains the dignity and the independence of a nation. A prince, by
acquiring private property in a foreign country, may possibly be considered as subjecting
that property to the territorial jurisdiction; he may be considered as so far laying down the
prince, and assuming the character of a private individual; but this he cannot be presumed
to do with respect to any portion of that armed force, which upholds his crown, and the
nation he is entrusted to govern.").
84. Id. at 147. Customary international law must have both general practice and
acceptance as law (opinio juris). As a source of international law, custom is explained in
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b): "The Court, whose function it is
to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall
apply: (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." Statute
of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031.
85. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor for the U.S. Sec'y of State, to
Phillip B. Perlman, Att'y Gen. (May 19, 1952), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/ddcaron/Documents[US-Statutes/1952-Tate-%2OLet
terRestrictiveSovImmunity.doc.
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Jack B. Tate, then Acting Legal Advisor for the Secretary of State
(Tate Letter). ' Tate contended that "[t]he Department has now
reached the conclusion that such immunity should no longer be
granted in certain types of cases."' He explained:
A study of the law of sovereign immunity reveals the existence
of two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely
held and firmly established. According to the classical or
absolute theory of sovereign immunity, a sovereign cannot,
without his consent, be made a respondent in the courts of
another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity, the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii)
or [sic] a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure
gestionis).
Tate justified adopting a restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity by stating that "the Department feels that the
widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of
engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice
which will enable persons doing business with them to have their
rights determined in the courts." 89 Tate also argued that the
absolute theory of sovereign immunity put the United States at a
disadvantage in foreign courts because the United States gave
immunity to foreign governments but "subject[ed] itself to suit in
these same courts in both contract and tort and with its long
established policy of not claiming immunity in foreign jurisdictions
for its merchant vessels."'
However, the Tate Letter did not offer guidelines for the
application of the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign
immunity. 9' Consequently, courts had trouble determining whether
an action was "sovereign and public" or "private."' Additionally,
the Tate Letter raised questions about whether the executive or
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
9a Id. (emphasis in original).
91. Warren D. Zaffuto, Comment, A "Pirate's Victory": President Clinton's Approach
to the New FSIA Exception Leaves the Victors Empty-Handed, 74 TuL. L. REV. 685, 695
(1999).
92. Id.
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the judicial branch should determine immunity.' In brief, without
more concrete legislation, courts could not apply the restrictive
theory of foreign sovereign immunity in a clear and uniform
94manner.
In 1976, Congress enacted FSIA "to define the jurisdiction of
United States courts in suits against foreign states, the
circumstances in which foreign states are immune from suit and in
which execution may not be levied on their property .... .
Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria was one of the first cases
to apply FSIA.' The 1983 Supreme Court decision showed that
the Court "consistently has deferred to the decisions.., of the
Executive Branch... on whether to take jurisdiction over actions
against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities."' As
attorney Charlene Caprio explains, however, recent FSIA cases
involving art and cultural heritage, e.g., Altmann v. Republic of
Austria " and Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam,' appear to ignore
the Supreme Court's deference to the Executive Branch by acting
against the Justice Department's recommendations for granting
immunity according to the FSIA.,0
93. Charlene A. Caprio, Artwork, Cultural Heritage Property, and the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 13 INT'L J. CULT. PROP. 285,287 (2006).
94. Zaffuto, supra note 91, at 695.
95. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 1330 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6623.
96. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
97. Caprio, supra note 93, at 288 (quoting Verlinden B. V., 46 U.S. at 486).
98. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 377 F.3d 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2004). Altmann was the
first case to apply the FSIA to a claim of artwork stolen by the Nazis. The works of art in
question were six paintings by Gustav Klimt, worth approximately $150 million, that were
stolen by the Nazis and later appeared in the collection of a state-run Austrian Gallery.
The court held that the Austrian government acted as a private party and engaged in
commercial activities such as advertising exhibitions and publishing books and photos
related to the Klimt paintings in question as well as loaning one of the paintings to the
United States. Caprio, supra note 93, at 291 (finding that "the Altmann ruling cast a wide
net to deny immunity under the FSIA and set in motion a string of U.S. court decisions
that are further chiseling away at foreign sovereign immunity when it comes to state-run
museums and educational exchanges of artwork and cultural property.").
99. Caprio, supra note 93, at 292-94 (discussing Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 517
F. Supp. 2d 322, where the heirs of the artist Kazimir Malewicz claimed ownership of his
paintings which had been lent to the Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam and subsequently
exhibited in the United States). While the court found that museum loans were
commercial activity, Caprio argues that "the court did not take into account how museum
loans are generally perceived in society as noncommercial activities that allow for cultural
and educational exchanges." Id. at 293.
100. Id. at 288.
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The FSIA also included certain cases in which sovereign
immunity was subject to exceptions. Section 1610(b) of the FSIA,
commonly known as the "commercial use" exception, states:
The property in the United States of a foreign state ... used for
a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune
from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a
judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State
after the effective date of this Act if... the judgment relates to
a claim for which the agency or instrumentality is not immune
by virtue of section 1605(a)(2), (3), or (5), or (7), or 1605(b) of
this chapter, regardless of whether the property is or was
involved in the act upon which the claim is based. '0'
The House of Representatives report on the FSIA .2 gives
examples of what constitutes "commercial activity." The exception
includes:
[A] broad spectrum of endeavor, from an individual
commercial transaction or act to a regular course of commercial
conduct. A "regular course of commercial conduct" includes
the carrying on of a commercial enterprise such as a mineralS 103
extraction company, an airline or a state trading corporation.
The Oriental Institute argues that the artifacts of the PFA
were used for scholarly research and have not been used for any
commercial purpose. " Yet books published with information from
this research Were sold for profit. 15 Iran, however, never
participated in the publishing of the books, nor did it receive any
profit from their sales. 10 The question therefore, arises as to
whether this action constitutes "commercial use" " even if it is
conducted by a third party, the Oriental Institute, and not by the
sovereign state of Iran.
B. Are the Artifacts Commercial Property?
In Rubin v. Iran, the plaintiffs' argument that the artifacts
constitute commercial property is two-fold. First, the plaintiffs
"sought to establish that the commercial use exception
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1), (b)(2) (West 2008).
102. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.
103. Id. at 6614.
104. Stein, supra note 5, at 5.
105. Wawrzyniak, supra note 14, at 25.
106. Id. at 27.
107. Id. at 24.
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encompassed use of property for commercial purposes by any
party, not just the foreign sovereign."'' " Attorney James
Wawrzyniak explains that this argument is textual in that:
Comparing the FSIA's language describing the exception from
immunity from attachment with the exception from immunity
from suit revealed that while the latter specifically referenced
activity "by the foreign state," the former did not. From this,
the plaintiffs reasoned Congress had made a deliberate choice
to allow all commercially used property owned by the foreign
sovereign-regardless of who used it-to be attached and
executed upon. The plaintiffs also cited dicta in a district court
case in Massachusetts that suggested the commercial use
exception would indeed apply to property used commercially by
a third party.109
Through this argument, the plaintiffs attempted to interpret the
"commercial use" exception to the FSIA as allowing Oriental
Institute to be the "third party." 110
In its Second Statement of Interest, "' the Justice Department
argued against the plaintiffs' interpretation of the "commercial
use" exception to the FSIA. The Justice Department began by
returning to Magistrate Judge Ashman's original finding
concerning whether the Oriental Institute constituted a "third
party" in the "commercial use" exception to the FSIA. 112 The
Justice Department established "[t]he Magistrate Judge, applying
controlling law, correctly found that under Section 1610(a), it is
the use to which the property is put by the foreign sovereign, and
not by any U.S. possessor, which controls the application of the
exception provisions of the FSIA." 11 The Justice Department also
called attention to the fact that the Magistrate Judge's opinion was
confirmed by the District Court in March 2005. 114
The Justice Department justified the Magistrate Judge's
opinion given the considerations that Congress took into account
when creating the FSIA. In its Second Statement of Interest, the
Justice Department defended:
108. Id.
109. Id. at 25.
110. Id. at 25-26.
111. Rubin v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 408 F. Supp. 2d 549 (N.D. Il1. 2005), Second
Statement of Interest of the U.S. [hereinafter Rubin Statement of Interest of the U.S.].
112. Id.
113. Id. at 3.
114. Id.
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[T]he sensitive foreign relations considerations associated with
the partial lifting of sovereign immunity embodied in the FSIA
were carefully weighed by Congress in circumscribing the limits
within which a foreign sovereign's property might be attached,
and the baseline presumption that Congress adopted was that
foreign sovereign property was to be treated as immune. 115
In response, plaintiffs highlighted that Iran had not appeared in
court in order to defend its immunity. '6 In December 2005,
Magistrate Judge Ashman agreed, finding that "sovereign
immunity is an affirmative defense that is personal to the
sovereign and as to which the sovereign bears the burden." .7 The
Justice Department considered the Magistrate Judge's finding
flawed because "[t]he statutory presumption of sovereign
immunity is applicable to the property at issue in these
proceedings and plaintiffs should have been required to meet their
burden of demonstrating that one of the statutory exemptions to
the presumption applies, regardless of the presence of the foreign
sovereign in this litigation." 8  Furthermore, the Justice
Department argued:
[T]he decision of the Magistrate Judge, if it is upheld and
applied in later stages of these proceedings, undercuts the
purposes intended to be served by the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, denies to a foreign sovereign the "grace and
comity" to which it is ordinarily entitled, and threatens the
foreign policy interests of the United States. 119
After Iran entered the proceedings and filed a motion
attesting that the artifacts in question were immune from
attachment under the FSIA, the Magistrate Judge's decision
continued to be maintained and utilized, clearly against the intent
of the Justice Department. 120
The second issue addressed whether publishing and selling
books based on scholarly research of the artifacts represents a
commercial activity. Using an element of the FSIA that directs
courts to determine whether or not the activity is commercial
115. Id. at 7 (internal citation omitted).
116. Id. at 4.
117. Rubin Statement of Interest of the U.S.,supra note 111, at 4. See also Rubin H,
408 F. Supp. 2d at 555 ("[A]n exemption from attachment must be affirmatively raised,
and it is the judgment debtor who bears the burden of proof.").
118. Rubin Statement of Interest of the U.S., supra note 111, at 112.
119. Id. at 2.
120. Rubin V, 2008 WL 192321 at *2.
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based on its nature, rather than its purpose, ," the plaintiffs argued
that "[i]f the nature of the use is one that a private (non-sovereign)
individual could engage in, it is described as commercial." 12 The
plaintiffs, therefore, concluded that the publishing and selling of
books by scholars at the Oriental Institute was a commercial
activity.
Professor Gil Stein, Director of the Oriental Institute, firmly
asserts that the tablets do not constitute commercial property. 12
He argues that the artifacts of the PFA have "never been...
bought or sold or used as a source of profit. They're in a different
category from the kinds of things that might be used for
compensation." 124 Furthermore, said Stein, "[t]he tablets are not
commercial assets like oil wells, tankers, or houses. Instead, these
types of culturally unique and important materials fall within a
special protected category and are not subject to seizure."' 3 To
date, the issue of whether the PFA constitutes commercial
property is unresolved. In fact, the latest opinion of the Magistrate
Judge reports that "[t]he Court notes that it has been nearly five
years since this case began and eighteen months since Iran entered
the proceeding, yet the litigation is still at the discovery stage." 126
V. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAWS REGARDING CULTURAL
PROPERTY
A. The UNESCO Constitution
In addition to addressing cultural property in domestic
legislation and case law, the United States had been at the
forefront of signing, ratifying, and implementing UNESCO
conventions calling for international cooperation in the protection
and preservation of cultural heritage. In November of 1946, after
ratification by twenty countries, including the United States, the
constitution of the UNESCO (UNESCO Constitution) came into
force. 27 The Preamble of the UNESCO Constitution explains
"[t]hat ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (West 2008).
122. Wawrzyniak, supra note 14, at 25.
123. Stein, supra note 5, at 5.
124. Puma, supra note 3, at 18.
125. Stein, supra note 5, at 5.
126. Rubin V, 2008 WL 192321, at *20.
127. See generally UNESCO Constitution, supra note 10.
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common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that
suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through
which their differences have all too often broken into war." 128
Additionally, Article 1 of the UNESCO Constitution defends that
"[t]he purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and
security by promoting collaboration among the nations through
education, science and culture in order to further universal respect
for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights .... " 129
Cultural property and comparative law expert John Henry
Merryman, in "Cultural Property Internationalism," interprets
Article 1(2)(c) of the UNESCO Constitution as identifying three
obligations of states parties vis-A-vis cultural heritage. " These
obligations are: (1) conservation and protection; (2) the
recommendation of international conventions; and (3) the
encouragement of international exchange." Merryman contends
that the UNESCO Constitution calls upon states parties to first
"protect the object and its context from impairment." 132 Next,
states parties must allow for "the quest for knowledge, for valid
information about the human past, for the historical, scientific,
cultural and aesthetic truth that the object and its context can
provide."'1 3 As a final note, Merryman defends that the object
must be "optimally accessible to scholars for study and to the
public for education and enjoyment." 134
128. Id. at pmbl.
129. Id. art. (I)(1).
130. John H. Merryman, Cultural Property Internationalism, 12 INT'L J. CULT. PROP.
11, 21 (2006); UNESCO Constitution, supra note 10, at art. 1(2)(C) ("To realize this
purpose the Organization will maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge; by assuring the
conservation and protection of the world's inheritance of books, works of art and
monuments of history and science, and recommending to the nations concerned the
necessary international conventions; by encouraging co-operation among the nations in all
branches of intellectual activity, including the international exchange of persons active in
the fields of education, science and culture and the exchange of publications, objects of
artistic and scientific interest and other materials of information; by initiating methods of
international co-operation calculated to give the people of all countries access to the
printed and published materials produced by any of them.").
131. Merryman, supra note 130, at 21.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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B. The Hague Convention
After the massive destruction and transfer of cultural
property that occurred in World War II, the international
community recognized the need to protect cultural property135
through international treaties. 136 In 1954, at the Hague, UNESCO
adopted the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict (Hague Convention). 3 This treaty
was the first international convention to exclusively address
cultural heritage.'38 The United States immediately signed the
Hague Convention, but never ratified it. 139 Patty Gerstenblith
explains that the Cold War had a role in the U.S. decision to not
ratify the Hague Convention. ' She asserts that despite the
"military necessity exception" present in the Hague Convention,
the U.S. government believed that it would not be able to attack
the Kremlin because it was a historic monument and would
therefore, be protected by the Hague Convention. ' With the end
of the Cold War, the U.S. military withdrew its objection to
ratification and in 1999, President Clinton handed the Hague
Convention to the Senate for ratification. 142
While the United States still has not ratified the Hague
Convention, 143 scholars like Merryman interpret certain aspects of
the Convention, such as the idea of the "cultural heritage of
mankind," to be universal.'" The Preamble to the Hague
Convention reads:
135. For the purposes of this note, the. terms "cultural property" and "cultural
heritage" will be used interchangeably.
136. PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 475 (2004).
137. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Protection of Cultural Property
Convention].
138. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 136, at 475.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. As of September 10, 2007, the United States was not one of the 118 States
parties to the Hague Convention. See United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E (last
visited Apr. 22, 2009) (listing states that have ratified the Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict).
144. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 136, at 475.
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Being convinced that damage to cultural property belonging to
any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage
of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the
culture of the world;
.Considering that the preservation of the cultural heritage is of
great importance for all peoples of the world and that it is
important that this heritage should receive international
protection; 141
Merryman asserts that the Hague Convention supports the
idea that cultural heritage belongs to everyone in the world. 46
C. The Cultural Property Convention (1970)
The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property 4 7 (Cultural Property Convention)
and its implementation in the United States define cultural
property and designate perimeters for its protection. Accepted by
the United States in 1983, the Cultural Property Convention
defines cultural property as "property which, on religious or
secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of
importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or
,, 148science and which belongs to the following categories ....
These categories include archaeological and ethnological
materials, as well as inscriptions and engraved seals which are
more than one hundred years old. 149 The Cultural Property
Convention calls on every state to "respect its own cultural
heritage and that of all nations" "' and stresses that "protection of
cultural heritage can be effective only if organized both nationally
and internationally among States working in close co-operation.""
The Cultural Property Convention maintains that interchange of
cultural property among states is necessary because it "enriches
the cultural life of all peoples and inspires mutual respect and
145. Protection of Cultural Property Convention, supra note 137, pmbl.
146. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 136, at 476.
147. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 27 U.S.T. 37, 823 U.N.T.S
231.
148. Id. at art. 1.
149. Id. at art. 1, $$ (c)-(f).
150. Id. at pmbl.
151. Id.
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appreciation among nations."'' 5 2 Finally, the Cultural Property
Convention recognizes that "cultural property constitutes one of
the basic elements of civilization and national culture, and that its
true value can be appreciated only in relation to the fullest
possible information regarding its origin, history and traditional
setting." 153
D. The U.S. Cultural Property Act
In 1983, the United States introduced the Convention on
Cultural Property Implementation Act (U.S. Cultural Property
Act) to implement the Cultural Property Convention into U.S.
law. 154 The U.S. Cultural Property Act accepts the definition of
cultural property as outlined in the Cultural Property
Convention. 15 The U.S. Cultural Property Act also establishes an
advisory committee, composed of experts in archaeology and
ethnology as well as three members who represent the general
interests of the public. 156 Moreover, U.S. Senate Report No. 97-564
describes the U.S. Cultural Property Act as "promoting U.S.
leadership in achieving greater international cooperation towards
preserving cultural treasures that not only are of importance to
nations whence they originate, but also to a greater international
understanding of our common heritage." 151 In addition, a comment
by the U.S. Department of State regarding the U.S. Cultural
Property Act contends that "[t]he legislation is important to our
foreign relations, including our international cultural relations" 15
and also includes the idea of "concern for the preservation of the
cultural heritage of mankind." "'
E. The Protection Convention (1972)
In 1975, President Gerald Ford oversaw the ratification of the
1972 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage (Protection Convention). 161
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Convention on Cultural Property, 19 U.S.C. § 2601(5) (West 1983).
155. 19 U.S.C. § 2601(6).
156. Convention on Cultural Property, 19 U.S.C. § 2605 (West 1987).
157. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 136, at 557.
158. Id. at 558.
159. Id.
160. World Heritage Convention, supra note 10.
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The Preamble to the Protection Convention states that: (1) the
"deterioration or disappearance of any item of the cultural or
natural heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the
heritage of all the nations of the world"; (2) "the existing
international conventions, recommendations and resolutions
concerning cultural and natural property demonstrate the
importance, for all the people of the world, of safe-guarding this
unique and irreplaceable property, to whatever people it may
belong"; and (3) "parts of the cultural or natural heritage are of
outstanding interest and therefore need to be preserved as part of
the world heritage of mankind as a whole." 161 Furthermore, Article
4 of the Protection Convention requires each state party to protect
and safeguard items of cultural heritage located within its
borders. 162 Moreover, Article 5(d) calls for each state party to
undertake policies and legislation in order to protect cultural
heritage. 163 Finally, Article 7 emphasizes the need for international
cooperation in order to protect world cultural heritage. "
Gerstenblith indicates that this concept of the universality of
cultural heritage is present in the 1972 UNESCO Convention and
in its implementing legislation by the U.S. Senate. 165
The United States clearly has public policy concerns for the
protection of cultural heritage, as evidenced by its actions in
signing and ratifying the UNESCO Convention. 6 The United
States has not made reservations 67 to the Convention's articles
161. Id. at pmbl.
162. Id. at art. 4 ("Each State Party to this Convention recognizes that the duty of
ensuring the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to
future generations of the cultural and natural heritage referred to in Articles 1 and 2 and
situated on its territory, belongs primarily to that State. It will do all it can to this end, to
the utmost of its own resources and, where appropriate, with any international assistance
and co-operation, in particular, financial, artistic, scientific and technical, which it may be
able to obtain.").
163. Id. at art. 5(d) ("to take the appropriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative
and financial measures necessary for the identification, protection, conservation,
presentation and rehabilitation of this heritage").
164. Id. at art. 7 ("For the purposes of this Convention, international protection of the
world cultural and natural heritage shall be understood to mean the establishment of a
system of international co-operation and assistance designed to support States Parties to
the Convention in their efforts to conserve and identify that heritage.").
165. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 136, at 557.
166. Id. at 556-57.
167. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(d), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (defining "reservation" as "a unilateral statement.., made by a State, When
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to
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requiring international cooperation for the protection and/or
preservation of cultural property. '6 Regarding Rubin v. Iran,
Charlene Caprio asserts that "[t]he United States' tradition of
respecting cultural heritage ownership rights of source countries
and native cultures has not been considered." 169
VI. THE CULTURAL PROPERTY OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE
A. Article 83 of the Iranian Constitution
From this discussion of what constitutes cultural heritage, the
question arises as to whether the artifacts belong to the Iranian
state or the Iranian people. Additional questions arise when
examining Article 83 of the Iranian Constitution, which states:
"Government buildings and properties forming part of national
heritage cannot be transferred except with the approval of the
Islamic Consultative Assembly; that, too, is not applicable in the
case of irreplaceable treasures." 170 Caprio interprets Article 83 to
mean that "pieces considered irreplaceable treasures to the
country are never transferable1.' 7 If Iran does not hold
transferability over the artifacts, Caprio concludes that "[a]n
attachment thus would only result in an unlawful taking." '72
New York-based attorney James S. Irani drafted a petition to
the Court opposing the seizure of the PFA tablets. In his petition,
Irani argues that the tablets "do not belong to any specific
government or administration." 73 He further argues that "[t]hese
tablets do not belong to the Iranian government but to the world
as well." 174 Irani's petition also demonstrated the interest of the
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application
to that State").
168. Declarations and Reservations to the Convention Concerning the Protection of
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL ID=13055&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=201.html#RESERVES (last
visited Apr. 22, 2009).
169. Caprio, supra note 93, at 287.
170. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'I Isla'mai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic
of Iran] 1358 [19801 art. 83, available at
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution ch06.php.
171. Caprio, supra note 93, at 299.
172. Id.
173. James S. Irani, Petition to US Federal Court in Chicago Opposing Seizure of
Ancient Persian Tablets, PAYVAND, Aug. 3, 2006,
http://www.payvand.con/news/06/aug/1032.html.
174. Id.
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Iranian-American community, as it included 1,200 signatures at
the time of its submission on August 3, 2006. 175
More recently, Trita Parsi, President of the National Iranian
American Council (NIAC), stated that "[t]he Iranian-American
community has felt helpless in face of this threat to their historic
heritage.,, 76 As such, NIAC requested and received pro bono
representation from Mayer Brown, LLP in March 2008. With the
help of the law firm, Parsi hopes to "creat[e] an avenue for the
community to have their concerns and interests considered in this
legal battle." 177 Representatives of the NIAC assert that the
artifacts do not belong to the Iranian government or state, but to
the people of Iran. 1' Djamshid Foroughi, a member of NIAC's
Board of Directors, explained that "[t]hese are priceless artifacts
and belong to the people and descendants of the Achaemenid
Empire. As Iranian Americans, we simply cannot allow our
heritage to be auctioned off." 17' Abbas Alizadeh, Senior Research
Associate of the Iran Prehistoric Project at the Oriental Institute,
reasons that:
These tablets belong to a [whole] nation. And any government
in power at any given time-now, in the future, or in the past-
is merely the custodian of these tablets, not the owner ....
Therefore you cannot seize them from the Iranian
government-or you would have to take the people of Iran to
court, which is impossible. "0
Similar to Article 83 of the Iranian Constitution, the statements of
the Iranian community and Alizadeh explain not only the
significance of the artifacts in question, but also the unlawfulness
of using them to satisfy a judgment against Iran.
175. James S. Irani, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (03c9370): Default Judgment
Against a Nation, PAYVAND, Aug. 2, 2006,
http://www.payvand.con/news/O7/aug/1O19.html.
176. Shadee Malaklous, NIAC Enlists Major Law Firm to Protect Persian Tablets,
NAT'L IRANIAN AM. COUNCIL, Mar. 12, 2008,
http://www.niacouncil.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=1060&ltemid=
2.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Golnaz Esfandiari, Iran: Tehran, U.S. Academics Challenge Seizure of Persian
Tablets, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, July 12, 2006,
http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1051040.html.
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VII. OTHER WAYS OF COLLECTING FROM IRAN
It is important to note that there are other methods of
collecting from Iran that do not involve cultural property. In the
2005 Congressional Research Service Report entitled "Suits
Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism," Jennifer Elsea
explains the history of the FSIA as relevant for victims of state-
sponsored terrorism to receive compensation. "' The defendants in
the FSIA lawsuits are terrorist states, like Iran, who refuse to
appear in U.S. courts. '82 As such, large default settlements have
been awarded to the plaintiffs, who are victims of state-sponsored
terrorism. 18 In these suits, however, problems arose in collecting
on the awards due to the tension between the Executive Branch
and U.S. Congress. The Clinton and George W. Bush
administrations attempted to block assets from terrorist states,
including diplomatic or consular property. As a result, plaintiffs
could not collect on their judgments. 18
The Bush administration's rationale has several components.
First, it found that the United States must adhere to its
international treaty obligations to safeguard the diplomatic and
consular properties of other states. If it did not, the
administration contended that the United States would lose its
ability "to conduct diplomatic and consular relations and protect
personnel and facilities." ' In addition, blocked goods could be
valuable instruments of diplomatic leverage in the future.'8 The
administration gave examples of the use of blocked assets as a
leverage tool, "such as was used to gain the release of our citizens
held hostage in Iran in 1981 or in gaining information about POWs
and MIAs as part of the normalization process with Vietnam."189
Additionally, the administration explained that the ability to block
assets was an essential component to combat the "War on
181. Jennifer K. Elsea, Suits Against States by Victims of Terrorism, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS: CRS REPORT (July 31, 2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31258.pdf.
182. Id. at 2.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See generally id. Though both administrations objected to making available frozen
assets of terrorist states to satisfy judgments, President Bush signed the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act (TRIA) in 2002. Section 201 of TRIA overrode those objections. Id.
186. Id. at 13.
187. Id. at 14.
188. Id. at 9.
189. Id. at 13.
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Terror." '9 Furthermore, if preliminary claimants were to seek
attachment of blocked assets, there might not be any remaining
assets to compensate later victims. 19' The administration found that
this would lead to a "race to the courthouse" as holders of
judgments would have to compete for a limited amount of funds
that could be depleted. 1" Finally, the administration reiterated its
fear that U.S. assets would be subject to reciprocal action
abroad. 193
A. The Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2000
In spite of the administration's criticisms, Congress has tried
to enact measures to make payment to victims possible. 194 One
such act proposed by Congress was the Justice for Victims of
Terrorism Act of 2000. The Clinton administration opposed this
Act because it "would have amended the FSIA to allow the
attachment of all of the assets of a terrorist state, including its
blocked assets, its diplomatic and consular properties, and moneys
due from or payable by the United States." 195 More specifically,
the Act would not have given the President the authority to "waive
the requirements of this .section in the interest of national
security." 196 The Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act was not
made into law despite numerous protests accusing the President of
choosing "to protect terrorist assets over the rights of American
citizens seeking justice." 197
B. The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000
Discussions led by interested members of Congress with the
Clinton administration resulted in the enactment of an alternative
piece of legislation: Section 2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA).'98 The VTVPA
created a limited alternative compensation system for U.S. victims
of terrorism. 19 While unrelated to the Justice for Victims of
190. Id.
191. Id. at 14.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. Id. at 12.
196. Id. at 10.
197. Id. at 13.
198. Id. at 15.
199. Id.
[Vol. 31:257
Rubin v. Iran
Terrorism Act of 2000, the VTVPA "directed the Secretary of the
Treasury to pay portions of any judgments against Cuba and Iran
that had been handed down by July 20, 2002, or that would be
handed down in any suits that had been filed on one of five named
dates on or before July 27, 2000." ' The judgments against Cuba
would be paid out of frozen Cuban assets and the compensatory
damages of judgments against Iran would be paid by the United
States, which would then be required to seek reimbursement of
those payments from Iran. 201
While the VTVPA is certainly a step in the right direction to
compensate victims of terrorism, it is limited in application and has
been appropriately criticized. The VTVPA only provides
compensation to victims of Iranian-financed terrorism in ten pre-
designated lawsuits. 202 There is no clear indication that the Act will
allow for future compensation claims, nor does the Act state that it
will provide relief to those who have already received judgments
against Iran but were not included in the original ten cases.
Furthermore, critics of the Act have argued that using U.S. funds
to compensate victims of terror contradicts one of the main
reasons for the terrorist state exception to FSIA-that terrorist
states should be forced to pay for their actions in order to deter
them from future terrorist acts. 203
C. The Compensation Act of 2002
In its 107th session in 2002, Congress asked the administration
to include in its budget, a program that would ensure
compensation for U.S. victims of terrorism. When the
administration took no action on its request, "Congress added
more suits to those listed as compensable under § 2002 and sought
to make more frozen assets available to satisfy judgments." 205 On
April 16, 2002, Senator Tom Harkin introduced a bill entitled,
"The Terrorism Victim's Access to Compensation Act of 2002"
(Compensation Act), which would "allow American victims of
state sponsored terrorism to receive compensation from blocked
200. Id.
201. Elsea, Lawsuits Against State Supporters, supra note 19, at 3.
202. Id. at 4.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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assets of those states."" Harkin and the nine other senators that
supported the introduction of the bill207 found that "[t]he Secretary
of the Treasury lawfully controls billions of dollars in blocked
assets of several governments which the President and the
Department of State have determined to be state sponsors of
international terrorism and responsible for multiple terrorist
attacks on United States citizens abroad."2' They proposed that
the United States should adopt a policy "to use the blocked assets
of state sponsors of acts of terrorism (including their agencies and
instrumentalities) that are under the control of the Secretary of the
Treasury to pay court-ordered judgments and awards made to
United States nationals harmed by such acts . 2" The senators
further insisted that the bill "provide equal access to all United
States victims of state sponsored terrorism who have secured
judgments and awards in Federal courts against state sponsors of
terrorism." 210 Additionally, the sponsoring senators found that the
bill would serve as a deterrent for terrorist-supporting states. "'
The Compensation Act also includes a "presidential waiver,"
allowing the President, on a case-by-case basis, to choose not to
allow a judgment to be satisfied using certain blocked assets, if it
212 iwould not serve the interest of national security. There is,
however, an exception to the presidential waiver, which reads: "A
waiver under this subsection shall not apply to (A) property
subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations that has been used for
206. Terrorism Victim's Access to Compensation Act of 2002, S. 2134, 107th Cong.
(2002) [hereinafter Terrorism Victim's Act].
207. See id. (The senators sponsoring the Terrorism Victim's Access to Compensation
Act of 2002 were: Tom Harkin (IA), George Allen (VA), Robert C. Smith (NH), Charles
E. Schumer (NY), Donald Nickles (OK), Hillary Rodham Clinton (NY), John Warner
(VA), Barbara Mikulski (MD), Conrad Burns (MT), and Larry Craig (ID)).
208. Id. § 2(3).
209. Id. § 3(1).
210. Id. § 3(2).
211. See id. § 2(5) ("Paying victims of state sponsored terrorism from the blocked
assets of state sponsors of acts of terrorism (including their agencies and instrumentalities)
will punish those entities, deter future acts of terrorism, and provide a powerful incentive
for any foreign government to stop sponsoring terrorist attacks on Americans.").
212. Id. § 4(b)(1) ("Subject to paragraph (2), upon determining on an asset-by-asset
basis that a waiver is necessary in the national security interest, the President may waive
the requirements of subsection (a) in connection with (and prior to the enforcement of)
any judicial order directing attachment or satisfaction in aid of execution of judgment, or
execution of judgment, against any property subject to the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.").
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any nondiplomatic purpose (including use as rental property), and
the proceeds of such use." 
213
In June 2002, Senators Harkin and Allen developed an
amendment (Amendment) to the Compensation Act in order to
specify that "compensation [would] be paid first and foremost
from the blocked and frozen assets of the state sponsors of
terrorism and their agents, not U.S. taxpayers." 21' The Senators
explained that there are numerous American victims who have
won verdicts and judgments in U.S. federal courts, but have been
unable to collect on their judgments. They attested that "[o]ur own
government has worked to prevent these families from
collecting."2 "' The Senators contended that "[t]he Harkin-Allen
Amendment sends a clear message to foreign governments that
sponsor international terrorism: If you sponsor terrorism, if you
attack innocent Americans, we will pursue you, we will bring you
to justice, and America will literally make you pay." 216
In response to the Compensation Act and the Amendment,
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) drafted an estimate of the
cost to the federal government of implementation of the Act. The
CBO estimated that the cost in 2003 of enacting the Compensation
Act would be $22 million, and in 2004 the cost would be an
additional $29 million. 217 It also accurately reported that "S. 2134
would increase the number of plaintiffs eligible to receive
payments under the Victims Protection Act." 21 8 Regarding Iranian
assets in the United States, the CBO referred to the Department
of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which
found that "the blocked assets of Iran are primarily properties
associated with their former diplomatic mission to the United
States" 219 and are valued at $23 million. 220 The CBO went on to
note that, because this property has been used for non-diplomatic
purposes since the suspension of diplomatic relations with Iran, it
213. Id. § 4(b)(2)(A).
214. Harkin-Allen Amendment on Terrorism Victim's Access to Compensation, S.
5568, 107th Cong. (2002) (amending S. 2134), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
binlgetpage.cgi?dbname=2002_record&page=S5568&position=all [hereinafter Harkin-
Allen Amendment].
215. I'd. at S5569.
216. Id.
217. Terrorism Victim's Act, supra note 206.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
2009]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
would be subject to the exception to the presidential waiver in the
Compensation Act. 221
D. The LautenbergISpecter Bill
The idea of compensation for victims of terrorism lay
dormant in Congress until January 28, 2008. On that date,
President Bush signed into law the final version of the "2008
Department of Defense Authorization Bill," which included a
measure that allows victims of state-sponsored terrorism "to seize
hidden commercial assets for compensation if they win judgments
in court.''21 Senators Frank Lautenberg and Arlen Specter
spearheaded passage of the Bill in their attempt to provide justice
to U.S. victims of terrorism. Based on the Justice for Victims of
State Sponsored Terrorism Act, the Lautenberg/Specter Bill
provided the plaintiffs in Rubin v. Iran alternative methods of
223compensation.
VIII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAWSUIT
If the plaintiffs are ultimately successful in Rubin v. Iran,
there are numerous implications for the academic and museum
communities. First, Caprio notes that there is no guarantee that a
possible buyer for the artifacts will keep the collection together
and/or allow for continued access by scholars and researchers. 22
For example, she asserts that, "[a]lthough it is likely that the
bombing victims would sell the tablets for money, a buyer is not
prechosen or prescreened and in the event of an auction, a wealthy
private bidder may very well outbid a museum or educational
institution."2 Secondly, Caprio demonstrates that "[t]he Persian
collections, if attached, may permanently be removed from the
research and educational communities or be altered, mismanaged,
inadvertently defaced or destroyed if private owners seek to
display or store the artifacts in ways that compromise their
preservation." 226 By selling the artifacts at an auction, the artifacts
would be scattered among private owners, and future scholars
221. Id.
222. Lautenberg/Specter Bill, supra note 11.
223. Id.
224. Caprio, supra note 93, at 298.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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would not be able to study the PFA as a collection. 227 Moreover, as
their importance lies in how they fit together, Caprio argues,
"[d]ividing the collections up among the victims of the bombings
can cause the collection to become permanently severed, with
important historical and cultural information forever lost." 21
Professor Gil Stein also asserts "the [lawsuit's] stakes are
enormous. If the lawsuit prevails, this would do irrevocable harm
to scholarly cooperation and cultural exchanges throughout the
world. ' 229 In addition, Professor Alicia Hilton claims that
"[f]oreign nations might also cease to lend art treasures to
American museums for study or temporary exhibits out of fear
that aggressive plaintiffs might seize the opportunity to execute
unsatisfied judgments." 30 Accordingly, Alizadeh suggests that "all
of the world's museums would be in danger." 
231
On the other hand, Strachman argues that, "[w]hether [the
artifacts] fetch... $100 or $100,000 or $100 million, whatever
funds are raised should be sued [sic] to compensate the victims.""
The question in this lawsuit is not whether the victims in Rubin v.
Iran are owed compensation, but rather, how these victims should
be compensated. As Senators Harkin and Allen explain in their
amendment to the Compensation Act:
American victims of state-sponsored terrorism deserve to be
compensated for their pain, suffering, and losses by those
terrorists who sponsor and commit these terrible acts. The
Congress should clear the way for those with court-ordered
judgments to be paid from blocked terrorist assets and, in so
doing, deter future acts of state-sponsored terrorism against
innocent Americans. 233
Additionally, Strachman contends that "if the University [of
Chicago] wants to buy the antiquities, they're free to do so. So
would any other institution. And if they want to convince their
partners, Iran, to simply pay the judgment, they're free to do that
as well. ' ' 4 Simply purchasing the antiquities, as Strachman
suggests, would leave the door open for future lawsuits by victims
227. See Hilton, supra note 18.
228. Caprio, supra note 93, at 298-99.
229. Stein, supra note 5, at 5.
230. Hilton, supra note 18.
231. Esfandiari, supra note 180.
232. Fight Over Ancient Persian Tablets Goes to U.S. Court, supra note 73.
233. Harkin-Allen Amendment, supra note 214.
234. Fight Over Ancient Persian Tablets Goes to U.S. Court, supra note 73.
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of state-sponsored terrorism to try to execute upon other
antiquities in research collections throughout the United States.
Changes in legislation, therefore, are necessary in order to ensure
that cultural property does not continue to be sought as a means of
satisfying a legal judgment against a sovereign.
IX. CONCLUSION
Rubin v. Iran presents myriad issues for the legal,
archaeological, and museum communities, as well as for the
Iranian community. A ruling in favor of the plaintiffs may
significantly alter how archaeological research is conducted in the
United States, as well as cause irrevocable harm to both the
artifacts in question and the relationship between the United
States and Iran, which is already unstable at best. The United
States has a duty under the UNESCO Conventions, which it
ratified in 1946, to cooperate with other nations in order to protect
and preserve cultural property as "a finite, depletable and
nonrenewable resource." 235 In addition, the United States has a
duty to follow Congress' original intent in drafting the FSIA. That
is, the foreign policy interests of the United States should not be
threatened.
On the other hand, a decision in favor of the defendants may
push the administration to respond to Congress' attempts to
provide alternatives to lawsuits, such as the recent
Lautenberg/Specter Bill. Moreover, such a decision may lead to
the creation of legislation that clearly defines cultural property and
protects it from being used to satisfy a U.S. court judgment against
a foreign sovereign.
Not only is it unlawful to use cultural property to satisfy a
legal judgment against a foreign sovereign, but protecting cultural
property has a moral component as well. Gerstenblith argues that
"[c]ultural property is that specific form of property that enhances
identity, understanding, and appreciation for the culture that
produced the particular property."' 6 Based on the findings of
Oriental Institute researchers, 23 7 one can conclude that the PFA
has indeed improved our understanding of the ancient Persian
culture. Moreover, as Cuno explains, "[c]ultural property is
235. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 136, at 642.
236. Id. at 569.
237. Parisi, supra note 28.
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presumed to have a special meaning to the powers that claim it
(also to the people governed by those powers). It is said to derive
from them and to be a part of them. It is central to their identity.
And they are attached to it emotionally."' " The interest and
involvement of the Iranian American community in Rubin v. Iran
clearly demonstrates the importance of the PFA to their cultural
heritage, which the United States has a responsibility to protect
and preserve under international law. Claire R. Thomas"*
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